executive branch determination that they are "enemy" or "unlawful" combatants. 3 Further, the Bush administration has asserted that either there should be no judicial review of executive branch determinations, or if judicial review obtains, the judiciary should completely or nearly completely defer to these determinations. 4 International law, the U.S. Constitution, federal case law, and other legal norms do not support the Bush administration's positions on detention and judicial review. Rather, these sources of law indicate that there are legal limits to the power to detain persons without trial, that judicial review of the propriety of detention must be made available, and that no legal standard of review permits complete deference to executive determinations of the legal status and rights of persons detained without trial.
This Essay takes up these challenges to the Bush administration's detention and judicial review policies. Part II focuses on international lawspeciªcally, human rights (Part II.A) and the law governing prisoners of war (POWs) and others detained without trial during war (Part II.B). As documented in Part II.A of this Essay, human rights law applicable in all social contexts, including times of national emergency and war, prohibits arbitrary detention of persons and requires the availability of judicial review of the propriety of detention. The standard that human rights law prescribes involves contextual inquiry as to whether detention is reasonably needed under the circumstances. Thus, if the executive branch chooses to detain someone, the detainee has the right to judicial review of the detention, but the executive branch could meet the human rights standard for review by proving that the detainee poses a serious threat to national security such that detention is needed. By effectively foreclosing all judicial review of its determinations, however, the Bush administration has violated this tenet of international human rights law.
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Part II.B of this Essay identiªes relevant international law concerning the status and rights of persons who do and do not have POW status. Under international law, POWs can be detained for the duration of an international armed conºict, but there are legal limits on the power of the United States to detain other persons during such a war. Part II.B also identiªes the international legal norms governing both judicial review of determinations of POW status and judicial review of the propriety of detention of all nonPOWs.
Part III addresses the status and rights of persons detained as security threats or POWs under U.S. case law by reviewing trends in federal court decisions concerning the judicial power and responsibility to determine the status and rights of persons detained, and by analyzing various standards that have been used for judicial review of such executive determinations. These trends demonstrate without exception that, contrary to the Bush administration's claims, the executive branch does not have complete and unreviewable power to classify persons as enemy or unlawful combatants and to detain such persons without trial. Overwhelming evidence also demonstrates that the executive branch assertion that there should be complete or nearly complete acceptance of executive determinations of the legal status and rights of detainees whenever judicial review pertains contradicts international law.
II. The Propriety of Detention and Necessity of Judicial Review
Under International Law A. Human Rights Standards in Time of Peace, National Emergency, or War
Permissible Detention Under Human Rights Law
Under international law, human rights standards that are both treatybased and part of customary international law, and that are applicable in times of both peace and war, 5 establish standards for the propriety of deten-tion. These standards, recognized in nearly all major human rights instruments, include the prohibition of "arbitrary" arrest or detention. 6 For exam-G5 ple, in typically straightforward fashion, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) mandates: "No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention." 7 Additionally, the human right to freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention is part of a more general right to liberty and security of person. As noted in the ICCPR, a concomitant human right prohibits deprivation of liberty "except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure [s] as are established by law." 8 Thus, detention of terrorist suspects and others must not be "arbitrary," there must be legal grounds for such detention, and detention must be in accordance with procedures established by law.
Freedom from "arbitrary" detention is a relative right, however. Whether or not detention of an alleged terrorist or direct supporter of terrorism is "arbitrary" has to be considered in context and with reference to various interests at stake, such as the detainee's rights to liberty and security, the rights of others to liberty and security, 9 and the interests of the government in maintaining law and democratic order. 10 Under human rights law, therefore, detention will not be deemed "arbitrary" if it is reasonably needed under the circumstances.
Judicial Review of Detention Under Human Rights Law
When a person is detained by a state, human rights law requires the availability of judicial review of the detention. As afªrmed in the ICCPR, " [a] nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide 7. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(1). 8. Id. Similar provisions exist in other human rights instruments. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 6, art. 6; American Convention, supra note 5, art. 7(2); European Convention, supra note 5, art. 5 (1) .
9. The need to accommodate interests of others is also reºected indirectly in Article 5(1) of the ICCPR, which states that nothing in the covenant "may be interpreted as implying for any . . . group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation." ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 5 (1) . See also African Charter, supra note 6, art. 27; American Convention, supra note 5, art. 32 (2) ; European Convention, supra note 5, art. 17.
10. Although not addressing international law as such, dicta in U.S. cases recognize that governmental or national interests in security should also be weighed by the judiciary. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 696 (2001) ("[T] errorism or other special circumstances" might allow "special arguments . . . [to] be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security," but detention of an alien awaiting deportation must be limited to time reasonably necessary to secure removal of the alien and not beyond six months. Yet, "[f]reedom . . .-from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that" is protected by the Fifth Amendment.); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748, 750-52 (1987) ("Even outside the exigencies of war, we have found that sufªciently compelling governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous persons," so long as the government has met its burden of justiªcation "by clear and convincing evidence."). The fact that various interests have to be weighed in context refutes the idea that decisions of the executive branch in the interest of national security must be determinative.
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful." 11 Access to courts for judicial determination of rights and the right to an effective remedy are also guaranteed more generally under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR 12 and supplemented by General Comments of the Human Rights Committee created by the Covenant. 13 The human rights standard concerning judicial review should involve contextual inquiry into whether detention is reasonably needed under the circumstances and, thus, is not "arbitrary."
However, within the text of the ICCPR the right to judicial review of detention is impliedly a derogable right-that is, one that could be derogated from "[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation," when the existence of such an emergency is ofªcially proclaimed and a denial of judicial review is "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." 14 Such a denial, however, must not be inconsistent with the state's other obligations under international law (e.g., its obligations under the laws of war and the customary prohibitions against "denial of justice" to aliens) 15 and may "not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." 16 Thus, derogations are not permissible 11. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(4). Similar provisions exist in other human rights instruments. See, e.g., African Charter, supra note 6, art. 7(1); American Convention, supra note 5, art. 7(5)-(6); European Convention, supra note 5, art. 5(3)-(4); Universal Declaration, supra note 6, arts. No. 4, ¶ 186 (1988) (victim suffered "arbitrary detention, which deprived him of his physical liberty without legal cause and without a determination of the lawfulness of his detention by a judge or competent tribunal"); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 8, ¶ 4, Report of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 5, at 95 (1982) ("if so-called preventive detention is used, for reasons of public security, . . . it must not be arbitrary, . . . information of the reasons must be given . . . and court control of the detention must be available"). If a detainee is also "arrested," the detainee has additional rights. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(2)-(3). Moreover, review by a military commission will not comply with the requirement of judicial review. See generally infra notes 13-15, 18-22. 12. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 14(1) ("everyone shall be entitled to a fair . . . hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal"). 13. General Comment No. 29, supra note 5, ¶ ¶ 11, [15] [16] U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24, ¶ ¶ 8, [11] [12]  82 (Tex. 2000) ("The Covenant not only guarantees foreign citizens equal treatment in the signatories' courts, but also guarantees them equal access to these courts."); Jordan J. Paust, International Law as Law of the United States 75 n. 97, 198-203, 262 n.483, 256-72 nn.468-527, 362, 375-76 (1996) (citing numerous cases).
14. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 4(1)- (2) . 15. The customary prohibition against "denial of justice" to aliens generally requires that aliens have access to courts and the right to an effective remedy. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) 16. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 4 (1) . Similar provisions exist in other human rights instruments. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 6, art. 27 (1) . Equal protection and the norm of nondiscrimination are also standard in major human rights instruments. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 6, arts. 2(1), 14(1), G7 merely because they would be reasonable; they must be "strictly required" by the exigencies of the situation.
A strong argument exists that, notwithstanding this language, no circumstances should ever "strictly require" the denial of judicial review of detention, given that under the applicable standard concerning detention a state has such a low burden to justify detention to a court. Because a state merely must demonstrate that detention is reasonably needed under the circumstances, the state should have to make this showing to a court. In fact, many authoritative international bodies have articulated this view. For example, the Human Rights Committee has recognized that freedom from arbitrary detention or arrest is a peremptory norm jus cogens (and is, thus, a right of fundamental and preemptive importance), 17 has expressly declared that a state "may not depart from the requirement of effective judicial review of detention," 18 and has afªrmed that "the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of the detention must not be diminished by a State party's decision to derogate from the Convention." 19 Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has recognized that judicial guarantees essential for the protection of nonderogable or peremptory human rights are also nonderogable in times of emergency, 20 that the human right to be brought promptly before a judge must be subject to judicial control, and that judicial protection must include the right to habeas corpus or similar petitions and cannot be suspended during a time of national emergency. 21 Finally, the European Court of Human Rights has recognized that detention by the Executive without judicial review of the propriety of detention is violative of fundamental hu-14(3), 26; American Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1 (1), 24, 27(1) man rights law. 22 Such widespread recognition and the jus cogens nature of the right to freedom from arbitrary detention afªrm the nonderogability of judicial review and therefore require that the executive branch may not exercise its discretion to detain without independent, fair, and effective judicial review. Indeed, it is difªcult to imagine a more arbitrary system of detention than one involving an executive branch unbounded by law and whose decisions are not subject to effective judicial review. Fla. 1992 ). Other requirements of having "a ªxed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance," "carrying arms openly" during an attack, and generally following the laws of war expressly apply only in Article 4(A) (2) , which concerns members of certain "militias and members of other volunteer corps." GPW, supra, art. 4(A) (2) . These requirements do not appear in Article 4(A) (1) , which applies to "[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conºict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces," id. art. 4(A)(1), Article 4(A)(3), which applies to "[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an entity not recognized by the Detaining Power," id. art. 4(A)(3), or in any of the three remaining categories in Article 4(A 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631, states that belligerent status will "apply . . . to armies" and sets forth additional criteria to be met merely by "militia" or "volunteer corps." The customary 1863 Lieber Code also afªrmed: "So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of ªdelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or G9 the detaining country must release and repatriate them "without delay after the cessation of active hostilities," 24 unless they are being lawfully prosecuted or have been lawfully convicted of crimes and are serving sentences. 25 During an armed conºict, all persons who are not POWs, including so-called unprivileged or "unlawful combatants," have at least various nonderogable rights to due process under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (the "Geneva Civilian Convention") 26 and the ªrst Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions ("Geneva Protocol I"). 27 27. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 5. Concerning individual status and relevant rights to due process guaranteed by these treaties and customary international law, see GC, supra note 5, art. 3(1)(d) (all captured persons "shall in all circumstances" be tried in "a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples"-thus incorporating all such guarantees by reference and as nonderogable Geneva protections, including the customary guarantees mirrored in Article 14 of the ICCPR); id. art 5 (Even persons who have engaged in activities hostile to state security and who are not entitled to rights under the convention "as would . . . be prejudicial to the security" of a state, shall "[i]n each case . . . nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention."); Geneva Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 75(4), (7) ess protections under the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, human rights law, and other international laws as noted herein. In case of doubt as to the status of an accused criminal or detainee, the Geneva POW Convention requires that all persons "having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy" shall enjoy POW protections "until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." 28 
Detention of Other Persons
During an international armed conºict or war-related occupation, "a Party to the conºict" or an occupying power, can intern persons who are not POWs either in its own or the occupied territory under certain circumstances. To detain someone within the state's own territory, the person must be "deªnitely suspected of . . . [engaging] in activities hostile to the security of the State," and such detention must be "absolutely necessary," whereas to detain someone in occupied territory, the person must be "under deªnite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying power" and the detention must be "necessary, for imperative reasons of security." 29 Intern- Paust et al., International Criminal Law 692-95, 813-14, 816-17 (2d ed. 2000) ; Civilian Commentary, supra, at 14, 58.
28. GPW, supra note 23, art. 5. Cf. Aldrich, supra note 23, at 898 (stating that customary law now requires a tribunal's determination also whenever a captive asserts the right to be a POW); id. (stating that the tribunal review requirement "applies to any person not appearing to be entitled to prisoner-ofwar status . . . who asserts that he is entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war or concerning whom any other doubt of a like nature exists" (quoting Field Manual 27-10, supra note 27, at ¶ 71(b) and citing Geneva Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 45 (1))).
29. GC, supra note 26, art. 5. Under the convention, persons can be detained in U.S. territory if "deªnitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the" U.S.; a person can be detained in occupied territory if the person is "under deªnite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power" and will forfeit rights of communication if "absolute military security so requires." Id. See also Paust, Ad Hoc Rules, supra note 27, at 681-83. Internment of persons in U.S. territory is further conditioned by Article 42 of the convention, which allows internment "only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary." GC, supra note 26, art. 42. Internment in occupied territory is further conditioned by Article 78, which allows internment if "necessary, for imperative reasons of security." GC, supra note 26, art. 78. See also Civilian Commentary, supra note 27, at 257-58, 367-68 ("such measures can only be ordered for real and imperative reasons of security"); Jordan J. 1, 52-59 (1990) . Thus, under Geneva law, review of the propriety of detention in U.S. or occupied territory must involve a high threshold of necessity. Persons interned G11 ment without trial can last for the duration of the international armed conºict 30 or occupation, but detainees are to be released sooner if detention is no longer required for deªnite security reasons (e.g., release must occur upon termination of the armed conºict or occupation and in any event "at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power" 31 ). While such persons are being detained, they "shall nevertheless be treated in U.S. territory "shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose." GC, supra note 26, art. 43. See also Civilian Commentary, supra note 27, at 260-61 (adding that appeals should be reviewed "with absolute objectivity and impartiality" concerning whether detention is "absolutely necessary"). Rights of persons interned in occupied territory "shall include the right of appeal," and "[a]ppeals shall be decided with the least possible delay" and "shall be subject to periodical review." GC, supra note 26, art. 78. See also Civilian Commentary, supra note 27, at 368-69; Paust et al., supra, [56] [57] [58] [59] However, it should be noted that U.S. nationals and nationals of a neutral or co-belligerent country with which the United States has normal diplomatic relations are excluded from protections under Articles 42 and 78 of the Geneva Civilian Convention. See GC, supra note 26, art. 4. Nonetheless, they are protected under common Article 3 and Part II of the convention (covering protections in Articles 13-26), Article 75 of Protocol I, and human rights law. See id. arts. 3-4, 13; Geneva Protocol I, supra note 5, art. 75 (1), (3), (6); Paust et al., supra note 27, at 813-14, 816-17; Civilian Commentary, supra note 27, at 14, 58. This would be useful since the Commentary recognizes that persons detained in territory of the Parties to the conºict (such as Padilla and Hamdi in the United States) beneªt from "the rule contained in Article 3," stating: "the rule contained in Article 3 will be applicable: i.e. the Court must afford 'all the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.'" Id. at 58. The Commentary also states that " [t] his minimum requirement in the case of a non-international armed conºict, is a fortiori applicable in international conºicts." Id. at 14.
Guantanamo does not appear to be an appropriate territory within the meaning of Article 5, since it is not technically U.S. territory, although it is quite close to such status, and it is not war-related occupied territory. See Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note 23, at 25 n.70; Paust, Ad Hoc Rules, supra note 27, at 691-92 & n.68. Thus, detention at Guantanamo would be impermissible. Moreover, transfer of nonPOWs out of any U.S.-occupied territory in Afghanistan or Iraq would be a grave breach of international law. See, e.g., GC, supra note 26, arts. 49, 76, 147; Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note 23, at 24 n.68; Paust et al, supra, at 59. 30. See GC, supra note 26, art. 6. The application of the convention in the territories of parties to the conºict (as opposed to war-related occupied territory), and thus rights and competencies of the detaining power thereunder, "shall cease on the general close of military operations," a circumstance that can arise before the existence or formal recognition of an end of war or an armistice. Id. Thus, at least when the international armed conºict with the Taliban in Afghanistan ends, permissibility of detention under Article 5 of persons captured in Afghanistan or during that armed conºict will end. As a legal standard that is part of the laws of war, application of Article 6 (as with any rule of international law) should be within judicial power. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 63-67. But see Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 169-70 (1948) . Furthermore, since al Qaeda is not a state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent, the United States cannot be at war with al Qaeda as such (or with "terrorism" generally). Outside some context of war, the laws of war do not apply to operations merely directed against or involving al Qaeda. See, e.g 989, 1013 989, -15 (2d Cir. 1974 ) (The United States could not technically be at war with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), despite terrorist attacks by the nonstate, noninsurgent group.) Thus, outside the wartime context to which the laws of war apply, members of al Qaeda cannot be "enemy combatants," prisoners of war, unlawful combatants, or lawful detainees. Yet, they can be detained consistently with human rights law if detention is reasonably needed and therefore not "arbitrary." See supra Part II.A.1. Curiously, it is during recognized war, when the Geneva Conventions do apply, that detention of non-POWs rests upon the higher threshold of necessity. See supra note 29. Thus, with respect to permissibility of detention outside the context of actual armed conºict, it may have been a mistake for the Bush administration to have claimed that the United States is at "war" with al Qaeda and "terrorism."
31. GC, supra note 26, arts. 5, 43.
with humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by" the Geneva Civilian Convention. 32
Judicial Review of Detention and Status Under the Laws of War
When doubt exists as to whether a person is a POW, such person has the right to have his status "determined by a competent tribunal." 33 If any person detained during an armed conºict is not a POW, such person nevertheless beneªts from protections under common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which applies today in all armed conºicts and which incorporates customary human rights to due process into the conventions. 34 Thus, whether non-POW detainees are to be prosecuted or merely detained as security threats, each such detainee has the right under customary and treatybased human rights law to obtain judicial review of the propriety of his detention. 35 
III. Power and Responsibilities of U.S. Courts To Determine the Status and Rights of Detainees A. The Applicability of International Law as Law of the United States
International law applies as the law of the United States primarily in two ways: ªrst, treaties that the United States has entered into are binding on the United States and its nationals; 36 and second, customary international law is part of U.S. law. 37 32. Id. These rights include protections under common Article 3, which incorporates by reference customary human rights to due process. See supra note 27. cil Law No. 10, at 757, 1248 -50, 1270 (1950 'l L. 301, 301-21, 331-36 (1999) . These sources also demonstrate that customary international law has several constitutional bases for incorporation, is part of the laws of the United States, is not mere "common law," and has been used by U.S. courts for more than 200 years. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 13, at 5-6 (citing numerous cases and materials). See also infra text ac-
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Treaties that the United States has ratiªed can be binding law of the United States for various purposes regardless of whether they are self-executing or partly self-executing. Applicability of the Geneva Civilian Convention illustrates this point. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Fourth Circuit panel concluded that the Geneva Civilian Convention is entirely non-self-executing, 38 but this conclusion is incorrect. 39 The panel assumed that a treaty must provide a private cause of action to be self-executing. 40 This is not the test, however. 41 Federal courts have repeatedly held that a treaty need only expressly or impliedly provide an individual right for it to be self-enforcing. Regardless, the Fourth Circuit panel's reasoning missed the point that a treaty can be partly non-self-executing for one purpose but still be directly operative for another, such as for use defensively or for habeas purposes. 42 Fla. 1992 ) (explaining that, were the issue before it, "the Court would almost certainly hold that the majority of provisions of [the GPW] are, in fact, self-executing"); infra notes 41, 43. The Noriega court noted that "[m]ost of the scholarly commentators . . . make a compelling argument for ªnding treaties designed to protect individual rights, like [GPW] , to be self-executing," and that it would be "inconsistent with both the language and spirit of the treaty and with our professed support of its purpose to ªnd that the rights established therein cannot be enforced by the individual POW in a court of law." 808 F. Supp. 791, 797-99 (S.D. Fla. 1992 the Geneva Conventions expressly recognize private rights, 43 but they also retain the possibility of private causes of action for their breach-a practice that predates the conventions and exists more generally with respect to violations of the laws of war. 44 Further, the conventions openly contemplate "liability" and reparations. 45 Several federal statutes also provide an execut- Rev. 1103 Rev. , 1108 Rev. & n.19, 1121 Rev. & n.79, 1203 Rev. n.114, 1123 Rev. & n.85, 1129 Rev. -30, 1141 Rev. -42, 1199 Rev. (2001 ; Ruth Wedgwood, Remarks, 85 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 139, 141 (1991) . See also Restatement, supra note 15, § 111 cmt. h ("Some provisions of an international agreement may be self-executing and others non-self-executing."), quoted in Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 797 n.9.
43. See, e.g., GC, supra note 26, arts. 5 ("individual . . . rights and privileges under the present Convention," "rights of communication," and "rights of fair and regular trial"), 8 ("[p]rotected persons may in no circumstance renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention"), 27 ("[p]rotected persons are entitled to . . . ."), 38 ("the following rights"), 43 (persons interned "shall be entitled to"), 48 ("right to leave"), 72 ("right to present evidence," "right to be assisted by a qualiªed advocate or counsel of their own choice," "right at any time to object"), 73 ("A convicted person shall have the right of appeal . . . ."), 75 ("right of petition for pardon or reprieve"), 76 ("right to receive . . . spiritual assistance," "right to be visited," "right to receive"), 78 (persons interned for security reasons shall have "the right of appeal"), 80 ("rights" of internees), 101 ("[i]nternees shall have the right . . .
[t]hey shall also have the right"), 147 ("rights of fair and regular trial"); GPW, supra note 23, arts. 5 ("persons shall enjoy the protection"), 6 ("nor restrict the rights which it [GPW] confers upon them"), 7 ("Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention."), 14 ("are entitled"), 84 ("the rights and means of defence provided for in Article 105"), 85 ("shall retain . . . the beneªts of the present Convention"), 98 ("shall continue to enjoy the beneªts"), 105 ("shall be entitled to . . . 348, 351, 355, passim (1987) ; supra note 39. Indeed, most of the language setting forth rights and obligations in the Geneva Conventions is mandatory, and thus self-executing in nature, and sets standards designed for the protection of individual human beings. There are also numerous provisions from which rights can be implied, thus meeting tests set forth in Edye, 112 U.S. at 598-99, and Owings, 5 U.S. (9 Cranch 
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ing function for various purposes, including for private lawsuits. 46 More importantly, habeas corpus legislation provides an executing function for any wholly or partly non-self-executing treaty of the United States by expressly implementing all treaties of the United States for habeas purposes. 47 An express purpose of the legislation is to allow a habeas petition for any person "in custody in violation of . . . treaties of the United States." 48 International law also applies within the United States because customary international law, of which all of the 1949 Geneva Conventions form a part, 49 The Supreme Court acknowledged in 1936 that the "operations of the nation in [foreign] territory must be governed by treaties . . . and the principles of international law," 55 and in 1901 that executive military powers during a war-related foreign occupation are "'regulated and limited . . . directly from the laws of war . . . from the law of nations. '" 56 In addition to international treaties and customary international law, domestic legal constraints also bind the United States. For example, the Supreme Court noted that "constitutional limits" also exist "on the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief or as the nation's spokesman in the arena of foreign affairs." 57 The Supreme Court has indicated that "'even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.'" 58
B. The Power and Responsibility of U.S. Courts To Determine the Legal Status and Rights of Detainees Under International Law
United States courts clearly have judicial power to determine the legal status and rights of detainees under international law. This power derives from the uniform views of the Founders and from Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which empowers the federal judiciary to identify, clarify, and apply rights and duties arising under treaties and customary international law. 59 The Supreme Court has reafªrmed this power in numerous decisions. For example, in The Paquete Habana, 60 the Supreme Court recognized that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-54. Rodriguez Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. at 799-800. For a discussion of uniform views of the Founders on the subject as well as cases recognizing that the President is bound by international law, see Paust, supra note 13, 61, [71] [72] [73] 75 . The primary constitutional basis for this duty is mirrored in the President's duty to execute the law faithfully. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Since those in the executive branch are bound by international law, an order or directive to violate international law concerning detention, interrogation, or prosecution in a military commission, whether public or classiªed, would be patently illegal and of no lawful validity or effect. Concerning the duty of military personnel and others within the executive branch to disobey such an order, see, for example, Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note 23, at 28 n. 81 Paust, supra note 13, at 6-9, 34-36 & n.38, 40-48 & nn.44-59, 51-55, 143-46, 198-203, passim; Paust, supra note 37, at 301-05, 307-08. 60. 175 U.S. 677 (1900) . For further analysis of little known claims of the Executive, the actual holding of the case, and more recent errors with respect to the rationale and ruling and misuse of the case, see 
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tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." 61 More speciªcally with respect to the matters in issue, in Ex parte Quirin, 62 the Supreme Court afªrmed that "[f]rom the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes . . . the status, rights and duties of enemy . . . individuals." 63 In Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 64 the Supreme Court speciªcally addressed whether it and other federal courts had the power to hear claims based on rights expressly or impliedly afforded by treaties:
The reason for inserting that clause in the constitution [Art. III, Section 2] was, that all persons who have real claims under a treaty should have their causes decided by the national tribunals . . . . Whenever a right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the states; and whoever may have this right, it is to be protected. 65 The Supreme Court further emphasized these general points when, in response to claims in Ex parte Quirin that executive decisions denying access to courts to a class of persons are determinative and that, in any case, enemy aliens being detained should be denied access to courts, 66 it held that "neither the [President's] Proclamation nor the fact that they are enemy aliens forecloses considerations by the courts of petitioners' contentions." 67 Indeed, 61. 175 U.S. at 700. See also id. at 708, 714 (a court is "bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect to" international law; "it is the duty of this court"). Five years earlier, the same Court had recognized: "International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense . . . is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice as often as such questions are presented in litigation . . . ." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) . For additional cases, see infra notes 63, 71-73, 75. See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 261 (1984) (O'Connor, J.) (power "delegated by Congress to the Executive Branch" as well as a relevant congressional-executive "arrangement" must not be "exercised in a manner inconsistent with . . . international law").
62. 317 U.S. 1 (1942 763, 785, 771, 781 (1950) , denied the reach of habeas corpus to certain imprisoned enemy alien belligerents, but they were not being detained without trial and had been tried and convicted in the theater of war in China for war crimes committed in China. ) (assuming that habeas is only available to persons within the sovereign territory of the United States and deciding that the United States does not exercise any sort of sovereign jurisdiction and control at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Al Odah likely was decided erroneously. The habeas statute does not require "sover-as Ex parte Quirin recognizes, legal status and rights under international law are matters of law within the ultimate prerogative of the judiciary. Later, in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 68 Justice Jackson afªrmed that the Founders had omitted from the Constitution unreviewable presidential "powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency," noting that they knew how such powers would "afford a ready pretext for usurpation." 69 He proceeded to reassert the "control of executive powers by law," and assured that "it is not a military prerogative, without support of law, to seize persons or property because they are important or even essential for the military." 70 In fact, issues concerning POW status, the propriety of detention, and provisional characterizations by the Executive during war have been reviewed by courts according to international legal standards. 71 eignty" but only U.S. "jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (1994). The United States exercises "complete jurisdiction and control over and within" Guantanamo Bay of a sovereign nature under a treaty with Cuba, and as an occupying power exercising sovereign power inconsistent with the original purposes of the treaty. Per terms of the treaty Cuba only has "ultimate" sovereignty, and thus by necessary implication the United States clearly has some sovereign power at Guantanamo. 71. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28 ("From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals."); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866) (despite the insistence that Milligan was a prisoner of war, concluding that "[i]t is not easy to see how he can be treated as a prisoner of war under the facts"); id. at 134 (Chase, C.J., dissenting) ("Milligan was imprisoned under the authority of the President, and was not a prisoner of war," thus demonstrating that the Court ultimately decides who is a POW); United States v. Guillem, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 47 (1850) (holding that a neutral crew could not be made POWsand have its property conªscated-by the Executive, even if they were on an enemy vessel); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 398, 429 (1815); Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 431 (10th Cir. 1956 ) (regarding "access to the courts for determining the applicability of the law of war to a particular case," the Executive "could not foreclose judicial consideration of the cause of restraint, for to do so would deny the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law under it as construed and expounded in the duly constituted courts of the land," and would "subvert the rule of law to the rule of man"); In re Territo, 156 
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In other contexts, the judiciary has addressed the propriety of seizures of persons or property abroad in violation of international law 72 and has made ªnal determinations concerning the seizure of enemy or neutral property in time of armed conºict, often in conºict with the determinations of the executive branch. 73 In Brown v. United States, 74 Justice Story cautioned that the of the military was necessary" at all); id. at 118 (noting that despite the President's "earnest[ ] and persistent[ ] endeavor[ ] to enforce" neutrality, even "actuated by the high motive to faithfully execute the laws," such does not affect "the determination of legal questions," and ªnding that the Executive actions were "assaults of arbitrary power" and "unlawful"); id. at 111 ("'the executive has no right to interfere with or control the action of the judiciary'" concerning "proceedings against persons charged with being concerned in hostile expeditions" (quoting 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 267, 273 (1895) Keeler, 14 F. Cas. 173, 175 (D. Ark. 1843) (No. 7637) (the court will decide if detention is unlawful and will consider "the circumstances" to decide whether "reasonable grounds" support the habeas petition, but if "upon his own showing" petitioner is "clearly a prisoner of war and lawfully detained," denial of habeas is proper; moreover, "a strong case ought to be made out" by the petitioner so as not to unduly interfere with lawful military authority); Juando v. Taylor Shaw, 12 Johns. 257, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815 ) (Kent, C.J.) (civilian who allegedly was an enemy spy exciting mutiny and insurrection during war could not be detained by U.S. military for trial in a military tribunal); In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328, 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813 ) (habeas writ issued in wartime against a military commander holding a civilian charged with treason in aid of the enemy, since U.S. military did not have jurisdiction to detain him despite alleged threat to national security); Arndt-Ober v. Metro. Opera Co., 169 N.Y.S. 304, 306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918 ) ("a prisoner of war . . . is in no worse position than any other individual who is in custody for an offense" and "is entitled . . . to maintain an action"). See also infra notes 77, 89-90, 97, 108-109 . Writs of habeas corpus were issued against commanding generals even within the Confederacy during the Civil War with respect to those arrested for treason and conspiracy against the Confederate states. See, e.g., Ex Parte Peebles, Robards 17 (Tex. 1864 ) (when "the evidence is not legally sufªcient," applicants are entitled to be discharged).
72. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606 (1927) (executive branch violation of a treaty would affect jurisdiction); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-79 (2d Cir. 1974 ) (courts should assure "that the Executive lives up to our international obligations" (quoting Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973 ))); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 906 (D.D.C. 1988 ) ("The government cannot act beyond the jurisdictional parameters set forth in principles of international law . . . ."); United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927 ) (Executive seizure in violation of customary international law and a treaty obviated jurisdiction and is "not to be sanctioned by any court."). See also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) Judicial review of military actions taken under circumstances of claimed "necessity" during war has also occurred in other cases and has involved contextual inquiry into whether the military actions were required, "reasonable," or plainly justiªed. 80 Thus, exercise of war or national security powers must not only fall within the limits of law, but also must not take exception in the name of "necessity" or under some theory of ends-means justiªcation. To this sort of claim, the Supreme Court gave an apt reply in Ex Parte Milligan: 81 Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors . . . . Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepealable law . . . . The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence . . . . 82 The Court also emphasized that precisely at such times "the President . . . is controlled by law, and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute [and not violate] the laws," 83 adding, "[b] y the protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers." 84 During a heroic moment in judicial history, District Judge Herbert J. Stern, sitting in a specially convened Court of the United States in Berlin during prosecution of aircraft hijackers, refused claims of U.S. prosecutors that rights of the accused would be determined by the executive branch and that the proceedings and other governmental actions did not have to comply with the United States Constitution. 85 In reply to prosecutors' arguments on the grounds that important "foreign affairs" and "national interests" were at stake, Judge Stern noted that judges in that very city some forty years earlier had heard similar claims, but that they were clearly unacceptable:
When was it that Judges were supposed to worry about that in deciding what the law is? . . . in construing the rights of human beings? And when did it become permissible for lawyers in a courtroom or a litigant to tell the Judge that the piece of litigation is so important to the litigant that the Judge is ordered to ªnd a certain way? What system of justice are you referring to? . . . What Judge would do it for you? G23 . . . That's a vile thing for a Judge to listen to. He can't be a judge if he listens to that. 86 Instead, Judge Stern upheld predominant trends in judicial decision and traditional expectations that judicial attention to law must not be lessened merely because of the executive prerogative to conduct foreign relations as such and to prosecute alleged terrorist hijackings. The court noted that although laws might not directly regulate executive discretion concerning the conduct of otherwise permissible governmental operations, the Executive, in choosing among permissible options, must not violate the law. More speciªcally: "the talismanic incantation of the word 'occupation' cannot foreclose judicial inquiry into the nature and circumstances of the occupation, or the personal rights of two defendants which are at stake." 87 C. Two Recent Cases
Afªrming Judicial Responsibility
Recently, a Fourth Circuit panel has reiterated the view that the courts have the competence to review the legal status and rights of detainees. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Hamdi I) , 88 the Fourth Circuit panel emphasized the importance of "meaningful judicial review" and denounced the "sweeping proposition . . . that with no meaningful judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indeªnitely without charges or counsel." 89 On remand, the district court noted that the Bush administration "conceded that their determination of Hamdi's status was subject to judicial review," 90 and added:
While it is clear that the Executive is entitled to deference regarding military designations of individuals, it is equally clear that the judiciary is entitled to a meaningful judicial review of those designations when they substantially infringe on . . . individual liberties . . . . The standard of judicial inquiry must . . . recognize that the "concept of 'national defense' cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of [executive] term 'national defense' is the notion of defending those values and ideals which sets this Nation apart . . . . 91 Addressing signiªcant policies at stake in a constitutional democracy with respect to a viable check and separation of powers, the district court added that judicial acceptance of an executive determination as sufªcient justiªcation for detention "would in effect be abdicating any semblance of the most minimal level of judicial review," such that "this Court would be acting as little more than a rubber-stamp." 92 The district court went on to state that under "a government of checks and balances," a court cannot allow detention with "few or no standards" or on the "sparse facts" presented to support an executive decision to detain. 93 Indeed, allowing the Executive to make a ªnal determination with respect to the content and application of international law governing the status of persons, individual rights, and permissibility of detention would necessarily involve a violation of the separation of powers, 94 and would not be excusable under international law. 95 "does indicate" that detention "must be subject to judicial review," 108 "including the military's determination that he is an 'enemy combatant' subject to detention during the ongoing hostilities," 109 and recognized that petitioner has the right "to ask that the government provide the legal authority upon which it relies for that detention and the basic facts relied upon to support a legitimate exercise of that authority." 110 Nonetheless, instead of providing a proper check on executive power in wartime based upon law when liberty and other legal rights might be directly in peril, the circuit panel, in contrast to venerable Supreme Court precedent, 111 thought that a supposed "importance of limitations on judicial activities" should be "inferred," 112 and "any inquiry must be circumscribed to avoid encroachment into . . . military affairs." 113 Yet, it is precisely when law and legal rights are being trespassed that the judiciary must remain active, "play its distinctive role," 114 and not abandon in whole or in part "the explicit enumeration of powers" 115 and its historic role in our democracy. 116 It is in such situations that the judiciary should ensure that it provides meaningful, independent, fair, and effective judicial review. Even with the judiciary playing its proper role, the government's burden under human rights law does not seem difªcult with respect to persons who pose real threats to security, and is generally met if detention is reasonably needed under the circumstances. However, for the court to justify the detention of certain persons under Geneva law, it must deem the detentions absolutely or imperatively "necessary" under the circumstances. 117 The Padilla court has since scaled back its extremely deferential standard for evaluating executive determinations (Padilla II) . Upon reconsideration, the district court in Padilla II clariªed its "some evidence" standard to provide for greater review of executive determinations than what the Fourth Circuit panel in Hamdi II ªnally required. The district court in Padilla II stated that it "would not be free simply to take" executive "fears" as a test,
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"and on that basis alone deny Padilla access to a lawyer." 118 Instead, Padilla "has the right to present facts" and must have access to a lawyer for that purpose, 119 the court cannot focus "'exclusively on the evidence relied on by the executive'" in determining whether "some evidence" supports the executive branch determination, 120 and even under the "some evidence" standard the court "cannot conªrm that Padilla has not been arbitrarily detained without giving him an opportunity to respond to the government's allegations." 121 Thus, Padilla "is entitled to present evidence that conºicts with what is set forth" by the executive branch "and to have that evidence considered." 122 Nevertheless, contrary to international law addressed in Part II of this Essay, the district court in Padilla II tried to distinguish Hamdi II by arguing that the different circumstances with respect to the capture and detention of the persons merited different levels of deference to the executive. As in Hamdi II, Padilla II assumed that "if the petitioner does not dispute that he was captured in a zone of active combat operations abroad and the government adequately alleges that he was an unlawful combatant, the petitioner has no right to present facts" to dispute the government. 123 Additionally, Padilla II assumed that the "undisputed detention of a citizen during a combat operation undertaken in a foreign country and a determination by the executive that the citizen was allied with enemy forces" should be determinative. 124 Padilla, unlike Hamdi, "was detained in this country . . . by law enforcement ofªcers pursuant to a material witness warrant. He was not captured on a foreign battleªeld by soldiers in combat." 125 However, the argument for complete judicial abdication originally set forth in Hamdi II and the assumptions in Padilla II concerning the place of capture do not comply with international law and predominant trends in judicial decision documented in this Essay and do not make sense. For example, a journalist detained in a zone of active combat should be allowed to challenge the government's determination that he poses a threat, especially since numerous cases noted in this Essay demonstrate the propriety of judicial power to second-guess decisions of the executive branch that are made in time of war, even in a zone of active hostilities. 126 What is somewhat frightening about the claims made by the executive branch in Padilla II is that the government stated openly that there are "'numerous examples of situations where'" interrogation of persons detained without trial and without access to an attorney as part of a "delicate subjectinterrogator relationship" should proceed "'months, or even years, after the interrogation process began.'" 127 Similarly disturbing is the government's belief that persons should be denied access to an attorney if there is a need for ongoing intelligence, as new information is learned that may suggest new lines of inquiry, thus suggesting that the detainee has a new "intelligence value." 128 The problem with this approach is that international law requires access to courts for review of the propriety of detention, and detention in times of armed conºict can continue only so long as the person detained is a real security threat, as determined under a necessity standard. 129 The executive branch's claims that persons should be detained for intelligence value makes it all the more clear that judicial review of executive branch determinations must be effective, fair, and meaningful.
Part of the government's argument for seemingly unending detention incommunicado raises other concerns. The "delicate relationship" alluded to is designed for its "psychological impacts," to create "an atmosphere of dependency," 130 and to instill in the mind of the detainee the feeling "that help is not on the way" and thus to break down human will. 131 Yet customary and treaty-based human rights law requires, without exception, that no persons shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. 132 The same absolute prohibition exists in customary and treaty-based laws of war. For example, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires that all persons detained "shall in all circumstances be treated humanely," and that " [t] o this end . . . at any time and in any place . . . cruel treatment and torture" are proscribed in addition to "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment." 133 Article 5 of the Geneva Civilian Convention reiterates that "[i]n each case" persons detained as security threats shall "be treated with humanity," 134 a requirement G29 that is also reºected in Article 27. 135 Additionally, Article 31 requires that "[n]o physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them," 136 and Article 33 prohibits "all measures of intimidation." 137 Given these prohibitions, it would seem that psychological interrogation techniques used for months, if not years, in order to break down human will and instill a sense of hopelessness is contrary to several of the proscriptions outlined above. Equally disturbing are recent reports of unlawful interrogation techniques used in Afghanistan. 138 Courts should be vigilant in assuring that these types of violations of international law do not take place.
IV. Conclusion
While responding to terrorism and threats to national security, judicial robes must not be used to smother liberty and due process. If this occurs, the judiciary will in some measure be complicit in terrorist attacks on human and constitutional rights. Destruction of American values, overreaction, the weakening of real bases of strength of our democratic institutions, and lawless law enforcement can fulªll terrorist ambitions and are ultimately more threatening than actual terrorist attacks. Judges in a democracy committed to law and human dignity cannot countenance such a result.
Our forebears knew that lawless overreaction by those with executive power was a threat to human rights and our democracy that must be opposed by the judiciary and the American people. 139 Modern patriots of human rights and democratic freedoms must also take their stand.
"He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself." 140 be consulted and obeyed, not ignored, at a time like this").
140. Thomas Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government, in 2 The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 588 (P. Foner ed., 1945).
